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"SWEETHEART" ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN
LENDERS AND THEIR TITLE LAWYERS - ARE
THEY REALLY? -
ANDREW L. BLAIR*
W. HENRY JERNIGAN, JR.**
INTRODUCTION
During the past two decades, with the advent of the consumer move-
ment, the loan practices of banks and other lending institutions have
come under increasing scrutiny by both federal and state legislative and
regulatory bodies. This has led to a proliferation of statutes, rules, and
regulations designed to remedy certain perceived deficiencies in consumer
loan practices.' One of the more common practices that has come under
attack recently is lending institutions requiring borrowers, in connection
with home mortgage loans, to pay the fees of attorneys selected by the
lending institution to perform legal services incident to making the par-
ticular loans involved. Critics have characterized this required attorney
system as both unfair and anticompetitive2 as well as a denial of "con-
* Partner, Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O'Farrell, Charleston, W. Va.; A.B., 1936, Duke Uni-
versity; L.L.B., 1939, West Virginia University.
** Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O'Farrell, Charleston, W. Va., B.S., 1972, J.D., 1975, Wash-
ington & Lee Ufiiversity.
Jackson, Kelly, Holt & O'Farrell does not generally examine titles in connection with
home mortgage loans for or on behalf of lending institutions. The firm does, however, re-
present the West Virginia Bankers Association as well as various lending institutions in
West Virginia. In connection with such representations, Mr. Blair appeared before the At-
torney General of West Virginia to voice the firm's clients' opposition to the proposed rules
which are the subject of this article.
The loan practices of lending institutions are governed by numerous federal laws and
regulations. See, e.g., The Community Reinvestment Act Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 25 (1979);
Equal Credit Opportunity, Regulation B, 12 C.F.R. § 202 (1979); Home Mortgage Disclo-
sure, Regulation C, 12 C.F.R. § 203 (1979); Truth in Lending, Regulation Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226
(1979); Fair Housing Regulations, 12 C.F.R. § 338 (1979); Real Estate Settlement and Proce-
dures, Regulation X, 24 C.F.R. § 3500 (1979). This ever growing list of rules has led one
commentator to cite with some despair the admonition of James Madison: I
It will be of little avail to the people that laws are made by men of their own
choice if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read; or so incoherent that
they cannot be understood; or if they be repealed or revised before they are
promulgated or undergo such increasing changes that no man who knows what the
law is today, can guess what it will be tomorrow.
The National Law Journal, December 4, 1978.
2 Clark Frame, former President of the West Virginia Trial Lawyers Association, in a
written submission to the Attorney General of West Virginia characterized the required at-
torney system as "one of the most nefarious practices that one encounters in the legal sys-
tem." According to Mr. Frame, the required attorney system denies the consumer the right
to an attorney in whom he may have great confidence in one of the most important legal
transactions in which he may ever be involved. Record of Written Submissions to the Attor-
ney General of West Virginia Concerning the Required Attorney System, 50 (1979) (herein-
after cited as Written Submissions].
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sumer sovereignty."3 In addition, they have challenged it on antitrust
grounds.
4
One of the most recent attacks on this practice occurred in West Vir-
ginia where the State's Attorney General promulgated proposed rules
designed to eliminate it. In announcing these proposed rules, the Attor-
ney General attacked what he characterized as "sweetheart" arrange-
ments between lending institutions and certain title lawyers on the basis
that those arrangements served to maintain noncompetitive prices for the
legal services involved. Both the initial and revised versions of the rules
sought to eliminate this claimed restraint on competition by attempting
to prevent lending institutions from requiring that any attorney other
than one chosen or approved by the borrower perform the necessary title
work incident to a home mortgage loan.
Curiously, the proposed rules do not attempt to regulate lending insti-
tutions directly, but instead are aimed primarily at attorneys.7 Specifi-
I Id. at 135. While a popular sounding phrase, the precise definition of "consumer sov-
ereignty" is elusive.
" See, e.g., Foster v. Maryland State Savings & Loan Ass'n, 590 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 842 (1979); Forrest v. Capital Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 385 F. Supp.
831 (M.D. La. 1973), afld, 504 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975).
5 W. Va. Att'y Gen. Proposed Rule to Abolish the Required Attorney System in Title
Searches Paid for by the Borrower, 14-2 W. VA. ADM. REG. (1978) [hereinafter cited as Pro-
posed Rule].
6 W. Va. Att'y Gen. Proposed Rule to Abolish the Required Title Examinations Paid
for by the Borrower, 14-2 W. VA. ADM. REG. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Revised Proposal].
7 The revised rules speak in terms of "title examiners" rather than simply attorneys in
order to reach these occasional instances where title examinations are performed by profes-
sional abstractors. See Revised Proposal, supra note 6, § 101; W. Va. Att'y Gen. Commen-
tary on Rule, 14-2 W. VA. ADM. REG. (1979) (hereinafter cited as Commentary]. Generally,
however, title examinations in West Virginia are performed by attorneys.
By imposing sanctions against attorneys rather than lending institutions, the Attorney
General apparently hoped to avoid questions of federal preemption as to federally regulated
lenders as well as possible conflicts with the Commissioner of Banking for West Virginia
who is charged with overseeing the activities of state chartered lending institutions. W. VA.
CODE § 31A-2-4 (1975).
The West Virginia Attorney General's authority to regulate the manner or method by
which individual attorneys conduct their practice may likewise be subject to the attack. As a
number of individuals pointed out at the public hearings and in written submissions, the
West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has repeatedly held that it is vested with the in-
herent and constitutional right to regulate and control the practice of law in West Virginia.
See generally State ex rel. Partain v. Oakley, - W.Va. -, 227 S.E.2d 314 (1976); Committee
on Legal Ethics of W. Va. State Bar v. Graziani, - W. Va. -, 200 S.E.2d 353 (1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974). Whether the Court would permit a state agency to exercise
concomitant jurisdiction over those activities is an open and contested point as was made
clear by the West Virginia State Bar which stated:
The proposed rule of the Attorney General would have the effect of regulating the
practice of law in West Virginia. As a member of the executive branch of govern-
ment, the Attorney General has no authority over the practice of law under the
separation of powers doctrine. The regulation of the practice of law has been de-
clared to be inherent in the Supreme Court of Appeals. The West Virginia State
Bar vigorously opposes any attempt by the Attorney General or any other State
official other than the Supreme Court of Appeals to regulate the practice of law.
Written Submissions, supra note 2, at 278.
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cally, the proposed rules prohibit an attorney from accepting compensa-
tion incident to a home mortgage loan unless that attorney is chosen or
approved by the borrower.5 As a result, no attorney retained by a lending
institution to certify the validity of the institution's lien on the property
to be mortgaged as security for the home loan may accept compensation
in connection with that representation without violating the proposed
rules. The only exception would appear to be those instances in which the
attorney receives assurances that the borrower will not bear the costs for
these services either as a direct charge or in the form of higher origination
fees, interest rates, or prepayment penalties.
The claimed legal basis for the proposed ban is two-fold. It is predi-
cated upon the West Virginia Antitrust Act, which prohibits "every...
combination ... or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce," and
upon the West Virginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, which pro-
hibits "unfair methods of competition" and "unfair or deceptive acts or
practices."10 Unfortunately, the proposed rules also are predicated upon a
basic misconception of the role of the lending institution's attorney in
mortgage loan transactions.
These proposed rules, if adopted,1" may have a significant and adverse
impact upon the costs of home mortgage loans in West Virginia. 2 More-
over, they reflect a growing trend among the states to restrict the right of
lending institutions to employ legal counsel to performn services for them
incident to a home mortgage loan and pass the cost of those services on to
the borrower as a part of the cost of the loan. Virginia,
3 New Jersey,1 4
* See Revised Proposal, supra note 6, §§ 3.04, 4.02.
* W. VA. CODE § 47-18-1 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
10 W. VA. CODE § 46A-6-104 (1976).
" Originally, the rules were to become effective on February 16, 1979. See Proposed
Rules, § 1.03. Following public hearings, however, the Attorney General did not file the
proposed rules with the Secretary of State, but called for a one-year period of voluntary
compliance. If voluntary compliance succeeds, the proposed rules will not be filed. If volun-
tary compliance fails, the Attorney General intends to seek the necessary legislative ap-
proval to implement those rules. See Revised Proposal, § 1.04. Prior approval by the Legis-
lative Rule-Making Review Committee is mandated by § 29A-3-11 of the West Virginia
Code. By electing to seek voluntary compliance, the Attorney General has avoided tempora-
rily a possible confrontation in the Legislative Rule-Making Review Committee over adop-
tion of the proposed rules as well as protracted litigation in the event the rules had been
implemented.
12 See text accompanying note 91 infra.
13 VA. CODE § 6.1-330.23 (1979) provides in pertinent part:
[A mortgage lender] may require the borrower to pay the reasonable and neces-
sary charges in connection with making the loan, including the cost of title exami-
nation .... Provided, that in the case of loans on one to four family residences,
the lender may not require the borrower to use the services of a particular attor-
ney ... ; however, the lender shall have the right to approve any attorney ...
selected by the borrower; provided such approval is not unreasonably
withheld ....
4 N. J. STAT. ANN. § 46:10A-6 (1978 Supp.) provides in part:
No. . . "lender" shall require a borrower of a loan to be secured by a mortgage on
real estate to employ the services of the lender's counsel or an attorney specified
1980]
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Rhode Island,1 5 Maine1" and South Carolina,"1 for example, have enacted
legislation within the past four years restricting lending institutions' right
to designate their own attorney in home mortgage situations. Finally, the
Attorney General has suggested that his proposed rules serve as a model
for federal regulations designed to eliminate these so-called "sweetheart"
arrangements on a nationwide basis.1 '
The proposed rules raise serious questions regarding the propriety of
proscribing the activity involved, the legality of their promulgation and
implementation, and their likely effect on the cost of home mortgage
loans. Careful analysis demonstrates that the practice which the Attorney
General of West Virginia and the statutes in other jurisdictions seek to
regulate is not unconscionable. Moreover, a ban of this practice, whether
by statute or regulation, may be particularly ill-advised since it is likely
to increase significantly the cost of home mortgage loans to borrowers.
ETHIcAL CONSIDERATIONS
In issuing the proposed West Virginia rules, the Attorney General
publicly declared that, if adopted, they could save home buyers in West
Virginia up to $300 on the cost of financing a purchase.19 This saving,
by the lender but the borrower shall have the right to be represented in the trans-
action by an attorney at law of New Jersey of his own selection. The provisions of
this act shall not preclude a lender from requiring that documents prepared in
connection with a mortgage loan transaction prepared by a borrower's attorney to
be submitted to the lender's attorney for examination and review and to require
the borrower to pay a reasonable fee . . . for such service ....
"5 R. I. GEN. LAWS § 19-10-9 (1978 Supp.) provides:
Every [lender] which requires that a title attorney search the title of the subject
real estate shall first permit the prospective mortgagor to select a qualified title
attorney of his own choice to search the title of the subject real estate, provided
the lending institution may require the prospective mortgagor to provide it with a
title insurance policy in the amount of the mortgage. In the event the prospective
mortgagor does not select a qualified title attorney, then the prospective mortga-
gor shall sign a waiver permitting the lending institution to select its own
attorney.
1" MAINE CODE ANN. Ch. 9-13, § 439 (1979 Supp.) provides:
Every financial institution . . . which requires that an attorney search the title of
the subject real estate shall first permit the prospective mortgagor to select a qual-
ified attorney of his own choice to search the title of the subject real estate, pro-
vided the financial institution may require the prospective mortgagor to provide it
with adequate liability insurance or such other written policy requirements as the
bank may deem necessary to protect its interests.
" S.C. CODE § 34-31-31 (1979 Supp.) states that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision
of law, the borrower shall .have the right to select the closing attorney."
11 On March 30, 1979, letters were sent to the Chairman of the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, the Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency suggesting that they may
wish to amend their regulations to prohibit what he views as an unconscionable practice
particularly where the attorney designated by the lending institution is also an officer, direc-
tor, or major stockholder of that institution.
19 Written Submissions, supra note 2, at 809-10, 813-14.
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according to the Attorney General, would result from increased competi-
tion among attorneys and accompanying reductions in attorneys' fees
charged to consumers. 20 Following public hearings, the Attorney General
determined that the record "clearly indicated" that "sweetheart" arrange-
ments cause injury to competition and are unfair to consumers and com-
petitors.21 Specifically, he stated that as a direct result of this practice,
"[c]onsumers pay noncompetitive prices and are denied the opportunity
to choose whom they must pay. Lawyers are denied the opportunity to
compete with their services. '22 Moreover, the Attorney General concluded
that "[n]o compelling interest by tied lawyers or lending institutions is
justification for the practice.
'2
3
The Attorney General's "analysis" of the fact supporting the proposed
rules ignored the principal issue surrounding the controversy over his
proposal and similar state statutes. He relied instead on the simplistic
assertion that since the borrower pays the attorney's fee he should have
the right to select that attorney. While initially this appears logical, it
fails to address the more fundamental question of whether lending insti-
tutions, which usually make a greater initial "investment" than the bor-
rower does, should have the right to employ counsel in whom they have
confidence to perform title examinations, and to pass the costs of those
examinations on to the borrower as a cost of the loan. Basic to the resolu-
tion of this issue is the related question of whether the title lawyer repre-
sents the borrower or the lending institution in connection with the ser-
vices he renders.
A number of borrowers who appeared at the public hearings on the
proposed rules indicated that they believed their interests were, in fact,
being represented by the lending institution's attorney.24 Surprisingly,
" Asidb from the Attorney General's assertions that so-called "sweetheart" arrange-
ments between lending institutions and certain attorneys restrict competition among attor-
neys and keep the price of title searches high, Proposed Rule, § 2.01, nothing has been
offered to support the contention that the challenged practice adversely impacts upon the
cost of home mortgage loans. No empirical study of the practice involved and its effect on
costs has been cited, nor has there been any reasoned analysis of the effects of the proposal
on these costs. The record indicates that there has been no careful analysis of the effect
which either the practice sought to be banned or the ban itself will have upon the cost of
home mortgage loans. The Attorney General, however, has attempted to sidestep this defi-
ciency by simply stating that "[w]ithout regard to lower costs, competition itself is an ap-
propriate goal" and that "in the long run competition will reduce costs." Commentary,
supra note 7, at 380. But see Written Submissions, supra note 2, at 135. The abolition of
the required attorney system may not necessarily result in lower costs. See text accompany-
ing notes 83-84 infra.
21 See Commentary, supra note 7, at 43. Whether the record justifies the conclusion
reached by the Attorney General is, at the very least, questionable.
22 Id. at 43.
22 Id.
24 See id. at 13-14. It may well be that few lenders inform the borrower in a meaningful
way that the attorney being designated by the lender to certify title and prepare the neces-
sary closing papers is, in fact, representing the lender and not the borrower. To the extent
this problem does exist, however, it is clearly one of disclosure. Moreover, any confusion
1980]
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however, some members of the bar were unsure of exactly who they rep-
resented. In some instances, they expressed the opinion that they repre-
sented both the borrower and the lender.2 Yet, both the American Bar
Association and the West Virginia State Bar have made clear that this
type of dual representation may raise serious ethical problems if it im-
pairs the independent professional judgment of the attorney, or is under-
taken absent informed consent by both the borrower and the lender.2 6
In Legal Ethics Inquiry 78-7, the West Virginia State Bar Committee
on Legal Ethics reviewed the propriety of precisely the type of arrange-
ment which the Attorney General attacks.27 There, a West Virginia attor-
ney had complained of several incidents in which his clients sought home
mortgage loans from one or more lending institutions and were told that
an attorney selected by the lending institution would do the title exami-
nation and prepare the closing papers. The Legal Ethics Committee un-
equivocally rejected the complaining attorney's contention that this prac-
tice was both unethical and unconstitutional.
While it recognized that under certain circumstances, an attorney
might represent both the borrower and the lender, the Legal Ethics Com-
mittee made clear that as a general rule:
A lending institution may properly employ an attorney to per-
form services for it and to pay [sic] that attorney for such ser-
vices, and, if it desires, to charge [sic] the person obtaining the
loan with the cost of the loan including attorney fees. In such
case the attorney is the attorney for the lender and not the per-
son obtaining the loan. The borrower may employ an attorney of
his own choice, at his cost, and obtain from him a title examina-
tion and have him present at the execution of the closing papers.
The lenders' interests are substantial and they may impose this
resulting from a failure of communication is not germane to a resolution of the question of
whether lending institutions have a right to employ counsel to represent their interests in
connection with loan closings and to pass the costs on to the purchaser of the loan.
21 See Commentary, supra note 7, at 15-17.
20 Of the attorneys expressing the opinion that they represented both the borrower and
the lender in the mortgage loan transaction, it appears that few advised their "clients" of
this dual representation and obtained their prior consent. See Commentary, supra note 7, at
13. An attorney should not represent both sides of the same transaction if the exercise of his
independent professional judgment on behalf of either might be affected. The West Virginia
Code of Professional Responsibility and the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility both
specifically provide that a lawyer should decline employment opportunities if he might be
involved in representing differing interests. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSmILITY
(ABA CODE), DR 5-105(A); W. VA. CODE App., Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-
105 (1975). An attorney should consider representing both sides of a transaction only if it is
obvious that he can adequately represent the interests of each party to the transaction. ABA
CODE, DR 5-105(c); W. VA.- CODE App., Code of Professional Responsibility, DR 5-105(c).
The attorney must then get the consent of both parties after a full and fair disclosure of all
the facts and an appraisal of the possible effect on the exercise of his independent profes-
sional judgment. Id.
27 4 WEST VIRGINIA STATE BAR JOURNAL 158 (1978).
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or any other legally permissible requirement as a condition prece-
dent to the making of the loan. The borrowers have the privilege
of either accepting or rejecting the loan if they do not choose to
accept the conditions under which it will be made.28
In reaching this conclusion, the State Bar relied heavily upon both formal
and informal opinions of the American Bar Association's Committee on
Ethics and Professional Responsibility,9 all of which were generally in
accord with its findings.
Clearly, an attorney must avoid possible conflicts arising out of his
representation of both the borrower and the lender. In the absence of
such dual representation, however, the question becomes whether the at-
torney selected by the lending institution represents its interests or owes
his primary responsibility to the borrower who ultimately bears the costs
for his services. In Sibley v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans,30 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit noted that an analy-
sis of the role played by the outside attorney in mortgage loan transac-
tions.clearly indicates that the attorney's "primary duty" is to the lending
institution.
In Sibley, an attorney in Mississippi brought suit against the Federal
Land Bank of New Orleans seeking injunctive relief and damages as a
result of having been removed from the Bank's list of attorneys approved
to examine and certify titles, record instruments, and close loans on its
behalf. Sibley was joined in his complaint by the Mississippi State Bar
which sought to require the Bank to establish objective standards for ad-
mission of Mississippi lawyers to its approved attorney list.1
The Federal Land Bank of New Orleans was a federally chartered in-
stitution which made long-term, first mortgage loans on farm land to
farmers and ranchers in Mississippi, Alabama and Louisiana. Since 1922,
29 Id. at 159-60 [emphasis added]. The Committee went on to state:
It would be proper for a lawyer to represent the borrower and the lender with the
borrower's informed consent after full disclosure of the nature of the lawyer's rela-
tionship with the lender, provided also that the lawyer can in his considered opin-
ion satisfy himself that his exercise of independent professional judgment on be-
half of the borrower will not be adversely affected by his relationship with the
lender. The lawyer should be scrupulous in answering this question and any doubt
should be resolved against the multiple representation.
Id. at 163.
29 See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics, Intformal Vpinions, No. 643 (1963); ABA
Comm. on Professional Ethics, Formal Opinions, No. 868 (1965); ABA Comm. on Profes-
sional Ethics, Informal Opinions, No. 954 (1966).
30 597 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1979).
31 Brief for Appellee at 3, Sibley v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, 597 F.2d 459
(5th Cir. 1979). The Mississippi Bar's demands in Sibley that the bank establish an attorney
list were similar to the West Virginia proposal. Under the proposed rules, a lending institu-
tion must base its list of approved attorneys upon enumerated "objective" criteria. Exam-
ples of such criteria are set forth in § 4.03(c) of the revised rules and include the existence of
adequate malpractice insurance, a record without past errors, and a record without past
tardiness.
1980]
350 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW
the Bank had maintained a list of attorneys in the three-state area who
were approved by the Bank to examine titles, record instruments, and
close loans which it made. According to the Bank, attorneys on this list
were selected based upon personal recommendations and by reference to
publications such as the Martindale-Hubbell Law Directory.2
By 1974, the Bank's list of approved attorneys in the three states had
grown to between 3,000 and 3,500 lawyers in 1,400 different firms. There
had developed an increasing time lag between the filing of loan applica-
tions and the disbursement of loan proceeds which the Bank attributed,
in part, to the large number of attorneys performing services for it. Con-
sequently, the Bank that year elected to reduce the number of approved
attorneys by seventy percent.3 To accomplish this goal, the Bank's gen-
eral counsel solicited opinions from its field personnel as to which attor-
neys should remain on the approved list. The general counsel reviewed
the names of the attorneys submitted and formulated a final list. While
the new list reflected subjective criteria such as the professional reputa-
tion of the attorneys, their competence in title practice and their prompt-
ness in handling title matters, the Bank admitted that in some instances
arbitrary decisions had been made.-"
In his prayer for relief, Sibley requested a permanent injunction
against the Bank, enjoining it from denying, limiting or abridging the
right of a person to choose his own attorney to perform the necessary
legal services incident to a loan application. He further urged the Court
to require the Bank to notify all applicants for loans that they were free
to employ any competent attorney in connection with their loan
application.35
According to both the plaintiff and the Mississippi State Bar, the
Bank, by restricting its list of approved lawyers, had acted arbitrarily and
capriciously in violation of the due process clause of the United States
Constitution. Alternatively, they asserted that the Bank's action in reduc-
ing its list of approved lawyers had restricted competition among Missis-
sippi attorneys in violation of the Sherman Act.3 The Court rejected
" Brief for Appellee at 8, Sibley v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, 597 F.2d 459
(5th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 9; 597 F.2d at 461.
", 597 F.2d at 461.
1° Brief for Appellee, at 10-11, Sibley v. Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, 597 F.2d
459 (5th Cir. 1979). Like the prayer for relief in Sibley, the proposed West Virginia Rules
would require that loan applicants be informed of their right to employ their own competent
attorney in connection with loan transactions. Section 5 of the proposed Rules requires the
title examiner to tell the borrower that he may select the title examiner. This disclosure
would not be required if the title examiner knows or has reason to believe that the borrower
has been informed of his right, or that the borrower chose or approved him, or knows that
the lending institution that requested his services regularly informs borrowers of their
rights. Also, if the title examiner renders fewer than five title opinions per year to any lend-
ers requesting his services, he would be relieved of his duty to disclose. Proposed Rule,
supra note 5, § 5.02.
31 597 F.2d at 462.
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both contentions on the grounds that its determination that the attorneys
on the approved list represented the Bank and not the borrower was dis-
positive of both issues. Thus, "[tihe Bank's selection of its own attorneys
implicates neither the Constitution nor the Sherman Act.
'3 7
One significant fact which led the Court to conclude that the attorneys
handling closings on loans made by the Bank represented the Bank and
not the borrower was that, by the terms of its statutory and regulatory
mandate, "[t]he principal function of the Federal Land Bank is to make
first mortgage loans on farm lands .. ." In order for the bank to ascer-
tain that its security meets this requirement, it must rely on the attorney
who certifies title. As was succinctly pointed out, "[t]his reliance on the
attorney's exercise of professional judgment and discretion is the essence
of a lawyer-client relationship."39
Statutory and regulatory mandates similar to those addressed in Sib-
ley apply to institutions other than Federal Land Banks. National Banks
are required to assure themselves that any home mortgage loans which
they make are secured by a valid lien on the real estate.4 0 In West Vir-
ginia, building and loan associations may not take a mortgage or deed of
trust as security for a home loan "unless the title to such real estate is
approved by the attorney of the association.'41 Similarly, Federal Sav-
ings and Loan Associations and other lending institutions insured by the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation must maintain "an
opinion signed by such institution's attorney-at-law . . . affirming the
quality and validity of such institution's lien on the real estate" mort-
gaged as security on a home mortgage loan.
42
Thus, legislative and regulatory requirements as well as the dictates of
prudent business judgment have led many lending institutions to require
that their attorneys examine and certify title to the mortgaged property,
prepare the note and deed of trust or mortgage, and, after the loan clos-
ing, update the title and record the lien instrument. They thereby assure
37 Id.
- 12 C.F.R. § 600.20 (1980). Under the Farm Credit Act of 1971, 12 U.S.C. §§ 200-2259
(1976), loans made by a Federal Land Bank must be secured by first liens on the real estate.
12 U.S.C. § 2017 (1976). In order to properly serve their functions, federal land banks have
broad statutory discretion, including the power to "conduct studies and make and adopt
standards for lending." 12 U.S.C. § 2012(16) (1976); see 12 C.F.R. § 615.5060(a) (1979).
-1 597 F.2d at 462 (emphasis added). Cf. ABA Code Ethical Consideration 4-1 (lawyer
must preserve the "confidences and secrets of one who has employed or sought to employ
him") (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
40 12 U.S.C. § 371(a)(1) (1976).
41 W. VA. CODE § 31-6-21 (1975) (empahsis added). Other states impose restrictions on
regulated lenders similar to the West Virginia requirement that the building and loan asso-
ciation's attorney approve the title to the underlying real estate. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
6:922(A) (Supp. 1980). In Louisiana, "[e]very loan [made by a building and loan association]
on immovable property [shall] be secured ... by vendor's privilege and first mortgage upon
property within its primary lending area, unencumbered ... accompanied by certificate of
the attorney of the association to that effect."
42 12 C.F.R. § 563.17-1(c)(vii) (1979).
1980]
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themselves that competent attorneys perform the work, that their inter-
ests are properly represented at all stages of the transaction, and that
they have minimized the risk that the work performed is, in fact,
defective.
Since the attorney who performs title work for a lending institution
represents the lender, the cost of his services is clearly part of the cost of
the loan, which rightfully falls on the borrower. Nevertheless, critics of
the required attorney practice ignore this analysis and instead focus on
collateral matters that are irrelevant to a resolution of the central issue
raised by measures such as the proposed West Virginia rules. In his initial
proposal and throughout the public hearings, the West Virginia Attorney
General, for example, emphasized that the borrower and not the lending
institution must pay for the attorney's services regardless of who the at-
torney represents. He pointedly asked one witness at the public hearings
whether the witness knew "of any other area in which the person who
pays the lawyer's fee has no right to select the lawyer.
'43
Obviously, a major premise underlying the Attorney General's pro-
posed rules (and, no doubt, the various statutes referred to earlier) is that
the individual who pays the attorney fees should have the right to select
that attorney. Yet, in Forrest v. Capital Building & Loan Association,
44
the Court noted that it was a misapprehension of the facts to conclude
that he who pays the legal fees owns the legal services and, therefore, has
a right to select who renders them. As the Court in Forrest pointed out,
the borrower has no contract with the lending institution's attorney.
Moreover, the attorney works for, and generally certifies title solely to,
the lending institution.45 While the borrower must pay the fee of the at-
torney chosen by the lending institution, this merely represents an alloca-
tion of the costs of the loan to the party receiving the benefits of the loan.
West Virginia's Attorney General, and other critics of the practice, have
not recognized this fact, despite repeated judicial attention to this aspect
of the problem.
4 6
When viewed as a legitimate cost associated with making the loan, the
borrower's payment of attorney's fees is no different from any other
transaction in which the consumer pays either directly or indirectly all
costs associated with the production of the product or the rendering of
the service which he is purchasing. Rather than being unconscionable,
with all the sinister implications attendant thereto, these so-called
"sweetheart" arrangements which the Attorney General so vigorously at-
tacks and which the cited statutes seek to prohibit represent nothing
more than an exercise by the lending institutions of their fundamental
right to select their own counsel.
"' Transcript of Oral Testimony on Proposed Rules Taken in Charleston, West Vir-
ginia, at 233 [hereinafter cited as Charelston Transcript].
" 385 F. Supp. 831 (M.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 978 (1975).
" Id. at 839.
" See note 4 supra.
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THE PROPOSALS AND WEST VIRGINIA LAW
Irrespective of whether these arrangements between lending institu-
tions and their attorneys are somehow unconscionable, the question re-
mains whether this practice constitutes a violation of the laws of West
Virginia and is, therefore, subject to regulation by the Attorney General.
The claimed legal basis for West Virginia's proposed rules is twofold.
They are predicated first upon the West Virginia Antitrust Act 47 which
provides, in part, that "Every contract, combination in the form of trust
or otherwise, or conspiracy in restraint of trade or commerce in this State
shall be unlawful. '48 The Act further provides that the "establishment,
maintenance or use of a monopoly or an attempt to establish a monopoly
of trade or commerce . . . by any persons for the purpose of excluding
competition or controlling, fixing or maintaining prices" is deemed unlaw-
ful.49 The Rules are also predicated upon the provisions of the West Vir-
ginia Consumer Credit and Protection Act, 0 which prohibit any "unfair
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the
conduct of any trade or commerce." 51 These provisions parallel portions
of the Federal Trade Commission Act 52 and commonly are referred to as
the Little FTC Act.
According to the Attorney General, the West Virginia Antitrust Act as
well as the Little FTC Act form the blueprint for how the economic sec-
tor is to operate within West Virginia. The Antitrust Act is intended to
prevent restraints of trade and promote competition in the West Virginia
economy. In his opinion, the competition which is promoted by the anti-
trust laws is both an end unto itself, due to the economic freedom pur-
portedly fostered, and a means to an end, such as lower prices, more com-
petitors and greater market efficiency. The Little FTC Act, on the other
hand, has a two-fold purpose according-to the Attorney General. The pro-
hibition of unfair methods of competition is aimed at promoting competi-
tion in the business sector to benefit both sellers and buyers, while the
prohibition against unfair and deceptive practices seeks to protect con-
sumers from practices over which they otherwise would have no control.5 3
Mere assertion of these principles does not justify prohibiting the re-
quired attorney system, however, unless it can be shown that it has
spawned the evils the statutes seek to eliminate. There must be proof
that this practice causes an unreasonable restraint of trade, or is immoral,
unethical, or oppressive, or causes substantial injury to consumers or
competitors. A careful analysis indicates that the practice possesses none
of the foregoing characteristics and that its regulation is without any ba-
sis in law.
'v W. VA. CODE §§ 47-18-1 to 23 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
48 Id. § 47-18-3.
49 Id. § 47-18-4.
so Id. §§ 46A-6-101 to 108 (1976).
51 Id. § 46A-6-104.
52 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-77 (1976).
11 See Commentary, supra note 7, at 43.
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Antitrust challenges to the required attorney system presume that
home mortgage loans and title examinations made incident thereto are
two separate and distinct transactions.54 As such, lending institutions
which require borrowers to pay an attorney selected by the lending insti-
tution to certify title as a condition to extending a home mortgage loan
are predicating the extension of the loan upon the purchase of a second,
unrelated product - the services rendered by the attorney. This, accord-
ing to critics of the practice, constitutes a classic tying arrangement in
violation of the State's antitrust laws.
While courts have not interpreted the West Virginia Antitrust Act,
the Act itself provides that it shall "be construed liberally and in har-
mony with ruling judicial interpretations of comparable federal antitrust
statutes." 55 Thus, in analyzing the validity of the Attorney General's as-
sertions that the challenged practice constitutes an illegal tying arrange-
ment, it is necessary to look to and be guided by judicial interpretations
relating to similar practices under analogous federal statutes.
Federal court decisions have established that tying arrangements that
have a pernicious effect on competition violate the provisions of the Sher-
man Antitrust Act.58 The United States Supreme Court, in Northern Pa-
cific Railroad Co. v. United States,5 7 defined such tying arrangements as
agreements to sell one product "but only on the condition that the buyer
also purchases a different (or tied) product."8 The essence of an unlawful
tying arrangement is, therefore, the forced purchase of a second distinct
and separate commodity with the desired purchase of a dominant tying
product, which results in economic harm to competition in the tied mar-
ket. 9 Thus, in order for there to be an illegal tying arrangement there
must first exist two separate and distinct products.
Every court that has reviewed practices substantially similar or identi-
cal to a required attorney system has concluded unequivocally that sepa-
rate products are not involved. In Foster v. Maryland State Savings &
Loan Assoc.,60 the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit reasoned that:
The loan review services performed by the selected law firm were
provided to and paid for by the [lending institution] as an addi-
64 Id. at 11. The assumption that home loans and related title examinations are sepa-
rate transactions has no statutory, regulatory or judicial basis. See text accompanying notes
55-69 infra. In fact, the West Virginia Attorney General fails to specify in his commentary
on the proposed rules how the challenged practice violates the antitrust laws.
" W. VA. CODE § 47-18-16 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
56 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). Section 3 of the Clayton Act (15 U.S.C. § 14 (1976)) prohib-
its tying arrangements involving "goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other
commodities." It does not appear applicable, however, to situations involving the tying of
services such as is alleged to exist here. C. HILLS, ANTITRUST ADvISER § 29 (2d ed. 1978).
57 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
5s Id. at 5.
59 Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 509 (1969).
60 590 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 842 (1979).
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tional means of insuring the security of its loans. The attorney's
fee charge collected by the [lending institution] to pay for these
services was not demonstrably excessive, and did not enable the
defendant to secure a profit. Pursuant to both federal regulation
and Maryland state law, the [lending institution] was authorized
to charge its borrowers for these legal expenses. Under these cir-
cumstances, [borrowers'] payment of the attorney's fee charge to
the... lender represented an incidental and inseparable part of
their "purchase" of the loans, rather than the "purchase" of a
tied product.61
In Foster, the plaintiffs challenged, on antitrust grounds, Maryland
State Savings & Loan Association's practice of requiring that purchasers
of home mortgage loans either: (1) employ its law firm to certify title,
procure the title binder, prepare the necessary loan documents and con-
duct the settlement proceedings; or (2) if the borrowers employed some-
one other than the lending institution's law firm, pay a $100.00 service fee
to have the title binder reviewed and a mortgage or deed of trust pre-
pared by counsel- for the Association. According to the plaintiffs, this
practice constituted an illegal tie-in.
62
Prior to January 1, 1971, Maryland State Savings & Loan Association
had followed the practice which the West Virginia Attorney General ini-
tially advocated. In essence, the Association had relied solely on the bor-
rower's counsel for the preparation of the loan instruments and procure-
ment of the title binder. This practice, however, proved unsatisfactory to
the Association since many of the attorneys employed by the borrowers
were inexperienced and unqualified in the field of title examinations and
real estate settlements. Moreover, many borrowers had selected attorneys
on the recommendation of real estate developers 'or brokers. These attor-
neys tended to be less concerned with the quality of the title being con-
veyed than with facilitating the sale of the property involved.63 The sav-
ings and loan association consequently was seriously concerned about the
validity of the security it was receiving for loans. Accordingly, in 1971, it
began requiring borrowers to employ its law firm or reimburse the Associ-
ation for the costs of retaining its attorneys to review the title binder
prepared by the borrower's counsel and to prepare a mortgage or deed of
trust."'
41 Id. at 931; see text accompanying notes 79-81 infra.
82 Brief for Appellee at 6, Foster v. Maryland State Savings & Loan Ass'n, 590 F.2d 928
(D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 482 (1979).
63 Id. at 5-6. Like the defendant Association in Foster, many West Virginia lenders
feared that under the original proposed rules the borrower's attorney, while perhaps eco-
nomical, might lack the skills required to protect their interests. Moreover, they were con-
cerned that as the borrower's attorney, he might be more concerned with facilitating the
sale than insuring that the lender was properly secured.
" 590 F.2d at 931. If the borrower selected the Association's attorneys, no review
charge was necessary.
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At the close of the plaintiffs' evidence, the district court granted Ma-
ryland State Savings & Loan Association a directed verdict on the
grounds that the evidence conclusively demonstrated that no tying ar-
rangement or unlawful restraint of trade had been shown. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court, and made it clear that
the lending institution had the right to insist upon its own counsel. In
reaching this conclusion, the Court noted:
The [lending institution's] decision to purchase legal services at a
cost to [borrowers] was both legally authorized and motivated by
the legitimate business concern of insuring the security of its
loans. Incidental services purchased by the [lending institution]
for legitimate business reasons cannot be viewed as a separate (or
tied) product, merely because the buyer is charged for them. This
is particularly true with respect to legal settlement services, since
they represent an indispensible method of consumating [sic] the
loan transaction from both the borrower's and the lender's view-
point. [The borrower's] argument that such services should be re-
garded as a tied product simply ignores the fact that the [lending
institution] has a statutory right to employ its own separate
counsel to advise it and to charge the cost to its borrowers. We
conclude, therefore, that no tying arrangement is involved in this
loan practice. 5
The Foster Court relied heavily upon the decision of the United
States District Court for the Middle District of Louisiana in Forrest v.
Capital Building & Loan Association, which was affirmed per curiam by
the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.6 In Forrest,
attorneys brought suit against certain building and loan associations al-
leging that the associations had conspired to dominate the legal, notarial
and title insurance business by requiring borrowers to use attorneys se-
lected by the defendant lending institutions before granting borrowers
home mortgage loans. The plaintiffs alleged that the credit or money ad-
vanced to borrowers was the tying product while the legal and notarial
services required to consummate the credit transaction were the tied
product.
The evidence in Forrest established that the defendant lending insti-
tutions had required that attorneys of their choice certify to them that
the borrower had a good and merchantable title to the property to be
pledged as security. The lending institutions refused to accept attorneys
selected by the borrower to certify title. In rejecting the plaintiffs' conten-
tions that this practice constituted an illegal tying arrangement, the court
noted that:
65 590 F.2d at 932-33 (emphasis added).
66 385 F. Supp. 831 (M.D. La. 1973), aff'd, 504 F.2d 891 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 978 (1975).
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In the case at bar we find that no two products exist. The stipula-
tions entered into by the parties show as an uncontroverted fact
that the legal services are owned, contracted for, responsible
solely to, and work exclusively for, the defendant [lending institu-
tions]. These services are not for sale to the prospective borrower
but are merely an incidental service required both by state law
and federal regulation to consumate [sic] the loan.
7
Even if critics of the required attorney systems, in the face of the forego-
ing decisions, could show that two separate and distinct products are in-
volved, the system would not operate as a tying arrangement in violation
of statutes such as West Virginia's antitrust laws. Statutory prohibitions
against tying arrangements are designed to prevent a seller of two prod-
ucts from using his dominance in one product market to foreclose entry
of potential competitors into the second product market. Thus, in order
to establish an illegal tying arrangement, it must be shown that the al-
leged tying arrangement involves a seller who not only competes in the
tying product's market but also "participates for profit in the area of
competition to which the tied item belongs." 68
While lending institutions compete in the field of home loans, clearly
they do not compete or otherwise participate for a profit in the provision
of legal services - the allegedly tied product. As such, neither their desig-
nation of an attorney to certify the validity of the security to be taken in
exchange for a loan, nor the attorney's rendering of those services could,
under any circumstances, be viewed as an illegal tying arrangement.0 9
Thus, in promulgating his proposed rules, the Attorney General was
met with clear authority holding: (a) that no illegal tying arrangement
exists where the purported seller does not, in fact, compete in the tied
67 Id. at 836 (emphasis added).
86 Rodrique v. Chrysler Corp., 421 F. Supp. 903, 904 (E.D. La. 1976). See also Craw-
ford Transport Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S.
954 (1965); Nelligan v. Ford Motor Co., 262 F.2d 556 (4th Cir. 1959).
"' See Crawford Transport Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 338 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1964), cert.
denied, 380 U.S. 954 (1965). ih Crawford, Chrysler's dealers charged that the manufacturer
engaged in an illegal tying arrangement by designating the carriers who delivered cars to the
dealers, and charging the dealer for the associated delivery costs. Thus, like a borrower
under a required attorney system, the dealers had no voice in choosing who rendered the
service for which they were paying. The court based its decision that Chrysler's conduct was
not an illegal tie-in on two facts. Chrysler did not own any transportation carriers and it had
no financial interest in the carriers it used. Id. at 939. The court indicated that Chrysler had
neither attempted to invade and dominate the carriers' business nor received direct profits
from the transportation companies. Id.
The position of lending institutions is similar to Chrysler's in that they own no interest
in the firms they designate to represent them. Nor is there evidence that lenders receive
kickbacks or other renumeration from attorneys they designate under required attorney sys-
tems. Like Chrysler's conduct in Crawford, lenders' use of a required attorney system is not
an illegal tying arrangement since absent a purpose to create or maintain a monopoly, the
antitrust laws-do not "restrict the long recognized right of ... an entirely private business
freely to exercise ... independent discretion as to parties with whom [it] will deal." United
States v. Colgate, 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
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product market; (b) that the attorney designated by the lending institu-
tion represents the lender and not the borrower; and (c) that charging the
borrower for the services rendered in connection with that representation
was a permissible allocation of the costs of the loan and not a violation of
the antitrust laws. Unless willing to abandon the proposed rules, the At-
torney General was, therefore, compelled to rationalize the basis for those
rules in a manner not totally at odds with "ruling judicial interpretations
of comparable federal antitrust statutes."70 The Attorney General at-
tempts to accomplish this by asserting that irrespective of who the lend-
ing institution's attorney represents, in West Virginia, unlike Maryland or
Louisiana, the attorney renders services to both the borrower and the
lender based on the assumption that the borrower and the lender both
benefit from the attorney's representation of the lender. 1 This benefit
purportedly distinguishes the Foster and Forrest decisions and affords
the borrower the "right" to designate which attorney confers that
"benefit."
The Attorney General's claimed distinction is, however, without legal
significance. While an adept piece of rationalization, it fails to address the
fact that lending institutions do not participate for a profit in the provi-
sion of legal services. More importantly, it totally ignores his own admin-
istrative record which is devoid of any evidence suggesting that lending
institutions require the attorneys who they designate to render services to
the borrower or require that the borrower be represented by the lender's
attorney. To the contrary, as the West Virginia Bar Association Commit-
tee on Legal Ethics has pointed out, the borrower is free to employ an
attorney of his choice, at his cost, to represent his interests.72 To the ex-
tent the borrower elects not to employ his own counsel and chooses in-
stead to rely upon the work of the attorney representing the lender, he is
gambling that the attorney will perform the work in a competent manner
since, absent prior agreement by the attorney to represent both parties,
he owes no legal duty to the borrower.
Given these circumstances, the borrower may well benefit indirectly
from the services performed by the attorney representing the lender. He
may, however, suffer since defects which might be significant to the bor-
rower might not be disclosed in a title opinion rendered by a lender's
attorney if the defects do not materially affect the loan value of the prop-
erty. Irrespective of whether the borrower derives some benefit from the
services of an attorney representing the lender, a careful reading of both
the Foster and Sibley decisions makes clear that neither court considered
this purported benefit relevant to a determination of whether the chal-
lenged practice involves an illegal tying arrangement.
In Sibley, for example, the court specifically drew attention to the fact
that the borrowers involved benefited from the legal services being ren-
70 W. VA. CODE § 47-18-16 (Cum. Supp. 1979).
71 Commentary, supra note 7, at 17-18.
2 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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dered. Yet the fact that those services were being rendered in connection
with the attorney's representation of the lending institution rather than
the borrower was dispositive of the antitrust claims. 3 The required attor-
ney system operates the same way in West Virginia. Attorneys render
their title services in connection with their representation of the lending
institution incident to the loan transaction, and not as a separate and
distinct product. Consequently, there is no tying of two products. Accord-
ingly, the practice does not violate the West Virginia Antitrust Act, and
the proposed West Virginia rules, to the extent they are premised on the
antitrust laws, lack any legal foundation.
7'
In his Commentary on the proposed rules, the Attorney General ap-
pears to recognize that the antitrust laws may not offer a sound basis for
his proposed ban on "sweetheart" arrangements. As he points out, how-
ever, the proposed rules have also been promulgated pursuant to the
State's Little FTC Act which covers a much broader array of practices. 5
Yet, it would be a grave error to presume that the rather expansive terms
of the Little FTC Act confer upon the Attorney General carte blanche to
proscribe activities of lenders or their attorneys.
7 385 F. Supp. at 836.
74 The Third Circuit's decision in Mortensen v. First Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 549 F.2d
884 (3d Cir. 1977) has been suggested as support for the position that West Virginia's regu-
lation of required attorney systems is not governed by the analysis used in Foster and For-
rest. Commentary, supra note 7, at 17-18. In Mortensen, the plaintiffs alleged that the de-
fendant lending institution and its law firm tied legal services to home loans in violation of
the Sherman Act and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's regulations.
The trial court had granted the defendant's niotion to dismiss for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. 549 F.2d at 888-
89. On appeal, the plaintiffs challenged the district court's standard for ruling on a motion
to dismiss in an antitrust case where the jurisdictional requirement of conduct in or affect-
ing interstate commerce is inextricably related to the substantive merits of the claim. Id. at
890. The Third Circuit reversed the dismissal, holding that plaintiff's complaint alleged suf-
ficient interstate factors. Id. at 896.
The district court also had dismissed the complaint on the grounds that the alleged
violations of Federal Home Loan Bank Board regulations were within the Board's primary
jurisdiction. Id. at 898. Under 12 C.F.R. § 563.35(a)(3) (1979), rekulated lenders may not
condition a loan by requiring the borrower to contract with a specific person for legal ser-
vices rendered to the borrower. Section 563.35(d), however, permits lenders to require bor-
rowers to pay for the lender's attorney's services in connection with the loan. The parties in
Forrest, see notes 66-67, had stipulated that the legal services in question were rendered to
the bank. Thus, no issue was raised as to alleged violations of the Federal Home Loan Bank
Board's regulations. 549 F.2d at 899 & n.12. Since the parties in Mortensen had not entered
into a similar stipulation, the Forrest decision afforded no guidance to the Third Circuit in
resolving this claim. Id. Thus, the complaint alleged facts which rendered the claim within
the Board's primary jurisdiction.
Although the Mortensen court thus distinguished Forrest, its decision, like the Forrest
court's, did not address the merits of the claim that the lender's attorney provided services
to the borrower. Therefore, Mortensen does not provide any indication of how the cdurt
would have decided the issue. Moreover, the Fifth Circuit's subsequent decision in Sibley v.
Federal Land Bank of New Orleans, 597 F.2d 459 (5th Cir. 1979), answers the question left
open by Forrest and Mortensen, holding that the attorney who searched the title provided
services to the lending institution. See text accompanying notes 36-39 supra.
75 Commentary, supra note 7, at 18-19.
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Like the West Virginia Antitrust Act, the Little FTC Act has not been
subjected to judicial interpretation. Nevertheless, since its terms roughly
parallel those of the Federal Trade Commission Act, the guidelines appli-
cable to the FTC Act may likewise control the Little FTC Act. Appar-
ently based upon that premise, the Attorney General solicited and re-
ceived the views of the Federal Trade Commission's Bureau of Consumer
Protection on his proposed rules. Those views were presented by Lewis H.
Goldfarb, the Assistant Director for Credit Practices, at the public hear-
ing on the proposed rules in Martinsburg, West Virginia. 6
As Mr. Goldfarb candidly admitted at the outset, the FTC has had
only limited experience in matters incident to real estate settlement prac-
tices. The Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act, which requires
disclosure of settlement charges and prohibits kickbacks among the par-
ties, is, for example, enforced by the Department of Housing and Urban
Development. Real Estate settlement abuses by federally chartered lend-
ing institutions likewise do not fall within the jurisdiction of the FTC.
Regulation of those activities is solely within the province of the various
agencies charged with regulating the practices of lending institutions.
Despite its limited experience, the Bureau of Consumer Protection's
staff concluded that so-called "sweetheart" arrangements are unfair and
deceptive trade practices and that the Attorney General's proposed rules
are prudent and equitable to all parties. In reaching this conclusion, the
staff relied on certain standards which the FTC had published previously
for evaluating "unfairness." These standards measure the "unfairness" of
a practice according to:
(1) Whether the practice, without necessarily having been previ-
ously considered unlawful, offends public policy as it has been es-
tablished by statute, common law, or otherwise;
(2) Whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive or unscrupu-
lous; [and]
(3) Whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or com-
petitors or other businessmen).
7
7
The staff based its conclusion that required attorney systems are
"unfair" on three findings. First, the staff found that the specified attor-
ney has no incentive to charge a competitive fee, and that the borrower
cannot shop for an attorney who will charge less for services. Second, the
staff concluded that the attorney is motivated to act in the best interests
of the lender though most borrowers assume the specified attorney repre-
sents their interests. According to the FTC's staff, this constitutes a con-
flict of interest since the interests of borrowers and lenders do not always
coincide. Finally, the staff found that a required attorney system damages
7' Written Submissions, supra note 2, at 137.
7 Id. at 143. See also Statement of Basis and Purpose of Trade Regulation Rule 408,
Unfair or Deceptive Advertising and Labeling of Cigarettes in Relation to the Health
Hazards of Smoking, 29 Fed. Reg. 8234, 8355 (1964).
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the competitive position of non-designated attorneys by limiting their
ability to engage in price competition. 8
While the foregoing "findings" of the staff cogently set forth the basis
for their ultimate conclusion and, to a large degree, reflect the underlying
premise of the proposed West Virginia rules, those "findings" fail to with-
stand scrutiny when tested against the FTC's own standards.
According to the FTC's standards the initial point of inquiry is
whether the practice under review offends public policy as it has been
established by statutes, common law or otherwise. In the case of the so-
called "sweetheart" arrangement, the practice, far from offending public
policy, has long been sanctioned by both legislative and regulatory action.
For example, the Federal Home Loan Bank Board's rules and regulations
governing insured lending institutions specifically provide that:
In connection with a loan on a home.., occupied or to be occu-
pied by the borrower, an insured institution or subsidiary thereof
may require such borrower to reimburse it for legal services ren-
dered by its attorney or to directly pay such attorney for such
services .... 79
In addition, the West Virginia Legislature has authorized lending institu-
tions to collect reasonable amounts from home loan. borrowers to cover,
among other things, the cost of title reports.8 0 These specific authoriza-
tions are consistent with concomitant legislative and regulatory mandates
to lending institutions not to extend home mortgage loans without ascer-
taining, through their attorneys, that those loans are properly secured. 81
The only basis cited by the FTC's Bureau of Consumer Protection in
support of its claim that the challenged practice violates public policy is
the fact that the attorney involved represents both the borrower and the
lending institution, thereby creating a clear conflict of interest.82 Yet, the
attorney designated by the lending institution can ethically represent
both parties under certain circumstances. Moreover, as both the Sibley
and Forrest courts pointed out, where such dual representation is not in-
volved, the attorney customarily represents and certifies title exclusively
to the lending institution. The borrower's payment of the attorney's fees
associated with that representation constitutes nothing more than an al-
location of the costs of the loan.
78 Written Submissions, supra note 2, at 145-47. In addition to stating the basis on
which the FTC labeled the required attorney systems unfair, the FTC justified its opposi-
tion to the system by asserting that lenders could protect their interests through less restric-
tive means. Specifically, the FTC's staff believed that lending institutions would be secured
adequately if their attorney simply reviewed title documents prepared by the borrower's
attorney. The staff recommended that lending institutions be permitted to charge borrowers
for the cost of reviewing the documents. New Jersey has adopted a system similar to the
FTC staff proposal. See text accompanying notes 95-96 infra.
7. 12 C.F.R. § 563.35(d); see note 74 supra.
80 W. VA. CODE § 31A-4-30 (1975). See also MD. CODE ANN. art. 23, § 161GG (1973).
81 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
82 See text accompanying notes 24-39 supra.
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Recognition of the fact that the attorney's fee is one of the costs of
making a loan undermines the remaining findings of the Bureau of Con-
sumer Protection, as well. First, the staff asserts that the system injures
borrowers because the attorney's fees that are passed through to them are
often excessive. This erroneously assumes, however, that competing lend-
ing institutions have no incentive to hold down the costs associated with
consummating the loan transaction. The evidence submitted at the public
hearings held by the Attorney General makes clear, however, that lending
institutions compete with one another in the area of home mortgage loans
and closing costs.8 3
The incentive to hold down closing costs likewise undermines the staff
contention that "sweetheart" arrangements place non-specified attorneys
at a competitive disadvantage. Lending institutions, like all other con-
sumers of legal services, are sensitive to the cost of those services. When
all other factors are equal, lenders can be expected to select the most
inexpensive, competent provider of those services to represent their inter-
ests. Moreover, no attorney has the right to demand to represent any in-
dividual, including a particular lending institution. Lending institutions,
like all consumers of legal services, have a right to be represented by
counsel of their choosing.
Accordingly, applying the FTC's own "unfairness" standards, so-called
"sweetheart" arrangements do not constitute an unfair trade practice.
Absent such a showing or a showing that the challenged practice violates
the antitrust laws, the Attorney General lacks the legal authority to regu-
late lenders or their attorneys in the manner contemplated under the pro-
posed rules.
8 4
IMPACT OF THE PROPOSALS
The dubious legal validity of regulatory measures designed to elimi-
nate the required attorney system magnifies the importance of a final
consideration. Will the proposed West Virginia rules and similar state
statutes prove to be the panacea which critics of the system predict -
generating direct and substantial savings to the home buyer while in-
creasing competiton among competent attorneys in the area of title exam-
inations? While any analysis of the probable future effect of the proposed
" The Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA), 12 U.S.C. §§ 2602-17 (1976)
affords borrowers protection against "excessive attorney's fees" allegedly associated with re-
quired attorney systems. RESPA requires lending institutions to disclose to the borrower
the estimated cost of all legal fees that will be incurred in connection with making the loan.
12 U.S.C. § 2604 (1976). Thus, borrowers have the means to compare factors other than
interest rates when seeking a home loan.
14 See also Foster v. Maryland State Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 590 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 842 (1979). The Foster trial court held that even if a required attor-
ney system constituted a tying arrangement, the practice was not necessarily illegal. Where
such loan practices are instituted solely for a legitimate business purpose, they are not an
unreasonable restraint of trade prohibited by the Sherman Act, but instead comport with
the lender's right to select its own counsel. Id. at 933.
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West Virginia rules and similar state statutes is necessarily somewhat
speculative, a review of the economic and business realities surrounding
home mortgage loans indicates that the proposed rules may have an ad-
verse impact upon both lending institutions and borrowers.
The West Virginia rules seek indirectly to prohibit lending institu-
tions from requiring that any attorney other than one chosen or approved
by the borrower perform necessary title work incident to a home mort-
gage loan. Initially, the Attorney General sought to achieve this goal by
prohibiting attorneys from accepting fees for title work unless selected by
the borrower. In essence, he advocated granting to the borrower virtually
unfettered authority to select the attorney to perform the legal services
necessary to consummate the loan he was purchasing.
As initially promulgated, the proposed West Virginia rules granted
lending institutions only the right to reject "the borrower's first choice for
the attorney or law firm" provided the lender made a written explanation
for such rejection "based on reasonable criteria." Numerous individuals
appearing at the public hearings on these rules expressed the opinion that
this purported grant of authority to lending institutions was virtually
meaningless. First, the initial proposal nowhere defined "reasonable crite-
ria." Any number of factors could bear upon the decision to accept or
reject a particular attorney yet many criteria, such as the attorney's
promptness in handling little matters, his experience in the area, and his
general professional reputation, are largely subjective in nature. More-
over, they are merely indicia of the only factor pertinent to selecting
counsel, namely the perceived competency of the attorney to perform the
necessary title search and render an adequate title opinion, and therefore
cannot be viewed as determinative. In addition, the "reasonable criteria"
contemplated by the revised rules fail to give any consideration to the
character or general reputation of the attorney involved. For example, an
individual attorney, while competent, may have certain character flaws
which would lead a lending institution to conclude that it should not have
any dealings with him.
Even where a lending institution might believe an attorney selected by
a borrower is unqualified in the field of title examinations, it would be
understandably reluctant to render a "written explanation" that any re-
jection of that attorney was based upon factors bearing on his profes-
sional competency for fear of possible civil action for libel.8 5 This point
0' Banks would be reluctant to reject a borrower's attorney on grounds of incompetence
for several reasons. In addition to subjecting themselves to possible civil actions for libel,
they could incur the animosity of the public. If a rejected attorney is a member of a racial,
ethnic or other minority, public opinion, to which lending institutions are highly sensitive,
could turn against the institution. Moreover, there arises the possibility of state and federal
intervention, on human grounds, regardless of the legitimacy of the lending institution's
claim that the rejected attorney is incompetent to perform title services. The legal and pub-
lic relations ramifications of civil and governmental challenges would circumscribe the effec-
tiveness of any regulatory standard of competency. See Written Submissions, supra note 2,
at 22-23.
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was driven home during the public hearings when an attorney was asked
if he had ever been rejected by any lending institution to do title work.
Summarizing the basic fear of lending institutions he responded, "[I]f I
were ... they would have a nice lawsuit in their teeth."8 6
In order to avoid the likelihood of such suits, various individuals ap-
pearing at the public hearings advised the Attorney General that rather
than reject any attorney selected by the borrower, they or their client
lending institutions simply would require title insurance in all cases in
order to insure the validity of their security and to comply with applica-
ble regulations.8 7 This alternative, far from reducing the costs to borrow-
ers, would in most instances increase them.""
Following the public hearings, the Attorney General apparently recog-
nized that the initial version of his proposed rules might either increase
the costs incurred by borrowers or decrease the quality of title examina-
tions thereby jeopardizing the secured position of the lending institutions.
In an effort to minimize the likelihood of these results, the initial propo-
sal was amended in a number of respects. The most significant of these
changes are contained in Sections 4.03(b) and 4.03(c) of the amended
proposal.
Those sections permit lending institutions to establish a list of "ap-
proved" attorneys which they would be willing to accept to do the neces-
sary title work incident to a home mortgage loan. In formulating the list,
however, lending institutions must ultimately include either a minimum
of fifteen attorneys or one half the members of the bar in the county
where the lending institution is situated. Moreover, to the extent any list
consists of less than all practicing attorneys within the county in which
the lending institution is located, admission to that list must be based
upon "specific criteria related to the title examiner's willingness and abil-
ity to do title examinations for and consistent with the policies of the
lending institution." As examples of these criteria, the amended rules list
the adequacy of available malpractice insurance, the level of experience
the attorney exhibits, the attorney's record of past errors, and his record
for expeditiously performing services.
While somewhat more liberal than the original version, the revised
rules are no less objectionable from the standpoint of lending institutions,
" Charleston Transcript, supra note 43, at 256.
8 See Charleston Transcript, supra note 43, at 139, 163 & 225; Written Submissions,
supra note 2, at 7, 10, 12, 17, 27, 31, 194, 304, 307, 309-10, 312, 315, 329, 348, 621, 623 & 628.
In response to the repeated assertion that the proposed rules virtually would compel lenders
to require title insurance, one proponent of the rules noted he would "have a very strong
antitrust concern if banks actually got together to make a decision on whether to impose
title insurance. . . ." A uniform title insurance requirement, however, would reflect nothing
more than concern among lending institutions for insuring the validity of their security, and
not conscious lender collusion. See Charleston Transcript, supra note 43, at 226.
" The hearings conducted incident to the promulgation of the proposed West Virginia
rules included testimony that title insurance requirements would increase the cost to bor-
rowers on a $50,000 loan by almost $250. Charleston Transcript, supra note 43, at 138-40.
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which still must publicly pass upon the competency of individual law-
yers.89 Moreover, regardless of what factors may be looked to in ascertain-
ing the "ability" of any individual lawyer, those factors are necessarily
subjective and, therefore, subject to challenge. There is simply no reason-
able way to determine beyond peradventure whether an attorney who has
practiced for two years is more qualified to conduct a title search than
one who has practiced only eighteen months. The same dilemma plagues
a determination of the adequacy of malpractice insurance, or an effort to
establish a record of "tardiness." The nebulous standards contained in
the revised rules will place lending institutions in the precarious position
of defining the standards' scope at their own peril.
The revised rules fail to address these questions for obvious reasons.
Each determination is largely subjective and must vary depending upon
the lending institution, the individual attorney, and the circumstances in-
volved. Yet, the answer to each question reflects upon the perceived com-
petency of the attorney to perform the legal work involved. Thus, the
revised rules continue to place lending institutions in the position of pass-
ing upon the professional competency of the attorneys in their area.
In essence, statutory and regulatory measures like the proposed West
Virginia Rules require lending institutions to assume the role of bar ex-
aminers, passing judgment on who is qualified to practice law in the area
involved. The Foster court rejected s unduly burdensome the notion
that lenders should be forced to perform these judgmental functions.
While recognizing that a lending institution might be able to expand its
required attorney list to include several lawyers or firms, the court voiced
its belief that
[T]he defendant's failure to do so amounted on this record to a
legitimate exercise of business judgment that is outside the scope
of the antitrust laws. The defendant makes loans to borrowers
having diverse interests and differing needs for legal services. To
require an assessment of those interests and needs, and in turn an
examination of the qualifications and competency of counsel to
conduct loan settlements, would be to impose an unreasonable
burden upon the defendant. The antitrust laws do not require
the defendant to set up the board of surrogate law examiners
that would inevitably be required to implement the plaintiffs'
alternative. °
The lending institution's customers probably would bear the substantial
costs associated with reviewing and passing upon the professional qualifi-
cations of each attorney located in a particular county.91 Moreover, there
19 See text accompanying notes 85-88 supra.
90 590 F.2d at 934 [emphasis added].
91 Lending institutions might try to recover the costs of continuously reviewing the
qualifications of each local attorney from the borrower who is receiving the loan involved
through higher interest rates, origination fees or other similar charges. However, many lend-
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also would be a substantially increased risk of legal action, like the suit in
Sibley, instituted by attorneys not approved by the lending institution.
The cost of defending these suits likewise may be borne ultimately by the
consumer.
Thus, the revisions of the West Virginia proposal do not diminish the
likelihood that lending institutions will permit the borrower to select any
attorney to examine title and simply require title insurance in order to
insure the validity of their security. The policy normally would be a mort-
gage policy, protecting only the lender. Therefore, unless the borrower
obtained an owner's title insurance policy he would not be afforded insur-
ance protection. Far from enhancing the so-called "sovereignty" of the
borrower, these proposed rules will serve only to further complicate the
home loan process and increase the cost to the consumer.
The various statutes that states have adopted in an effort to eliminate
required attorney systems raise similar questions regarding their ultimate
impact upon the availability and cost of home mortgage loans. The Vir-
ginia statute, for example, provides "that in the case of loans on one to
four family residences, the lender may not require the borrower to use the
services of a particular attorney . . . however, the lender shall have the
right to approve any attorney . ..; selected by the borrower; provided
such approval is not unreasonably withheld." '92 This statutory provision
roughly parallels the initial version of the proposed West Virginia rules
and similarly raises more questions than it answers regarding the pur-
ported right of approval granted the lender. Upon what basis, for exam-
ple, might a lender disapprove an attorney selected by the borrower? The
only readily apparent basis is the perceived qualification of the attorney
involved. Yet, that is largely a subjective judgment. Moreover, even where
a lender genuinely doubts the competency of a particular attorney and his
ability to protect the lender's interests, it may nevertheless be reluctant
to disapprove that attorney for fear of possible civil action. Given the
possibility of such litigation, lenders may elect to require title insurance
where no such insurance was required before.
While the New Jersey statutory approach appears somewhat more cir-
cumspect than Virginia's, it too may ultimately raise the cost of home
mortgage loans. The New Jersey statute prohibits required attorney sys-
tems but allows lending institutions to require borrowers to submit docu-
ments prepared in connection with a mortgage loan transaction to the
lender's attorney for approval, and to pass the cost of reviewing the docu-
ments on to the borrower."
Statutes like New Jersey's ostensibly strike a balance between the in-
terests of the borrower and the lender. Nevertheless, in West Virginia and
other areas where title insurance has not, to date, been involved, the ben-
ing institutions already charge the maximum rate allowed. Inability to recover the costs
from any source will reduce the attractiveness of making home loans.
" See note 13 supra.
"' See note 14 supra.
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efits resulting from a review of the "documents" prepared by the bor-
rower's attorney, particularly the title opinion (to the extent it is a docu-
ment within the meaning of the statute), may be more illusory than real.
Obviously, the only means of verifying the accuracy of a title opinion is to
duplicate the title search which serves as the underlying basis for that
opinion. Yet the New Jersey statute would appear to preclude the lender
from recovering that expense, an expense directly attributable to the cost
of making the loan involved. In order to avoid incurring such nonrecover-
able expense items, lenders may again simply result to title insurance and
have their attorneys review the title binder procured by the borrower's
attorney in order to ascertain any relevant exceptions in the policy. 4
Efforts to prohibit required attorney systems, including the West Vir-
ginia Attorney General's proposed rules, may prove counter-productive. If
these efforts result in title insurance being required, the cost of home
mortgage loans will increase. If title insurance is not required, lending
institutions will incur increased risks of defective title examinations.
Thus these efforts may well prove, a boon for title insurance companies
while not materially benefiting either the borrower or the lender. Before
implementing West Virginia's proposed rules, the Attorney General must
assure that all of the competing interests involved are adequately pro-
tected and that the regulatory scheme will not, in fact, inure to the detri-
ment of those it is intended to protect. Similarly, federal regulatory agen-
cies and state legislatures contemplating similar prohibitions should avoid
the temptation to rush blindly forward in the name of "consumerism,"
and instead must seriously weigh the possible benefits against likely det-
rimental effects of regulating the legal service aspect of home mortgage
loans.
CONCLUSION
The underlying basis for the Attorney General's proposed rules in
West Virginia, and similar regulatory measures in other states, represents
a fundamental misunderstanding of the role of the lender's attorney in
home mortgage loans. Moreover, it represents a clear invasion of what the
Fifth Circuit in Forrest characterized as "the basic and fundamental right
of all persons to use counsel of their own choice . . ... " The attorney
designated by the lender generally represents only the lender. The bor-
rower pays the fees of that attorney just as he pays all other costs associ-
ated with making the loan. His payment of those fees merely represents
an allocation of the costs of the loan to the party receiving the benefits of
the loan.
The defendant lending institution in Foster v. Maryland State Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
590 F.2d 928 (D.C. Cir. 1978) had offered borrowers the option to employ the lender's attor-
ney, or to employ their own and pay the defendant the cost it incurred in having the title
binder reviewed and preparing the mortgage or deed of trust. See text accompanying notes
60-65 supra. Neither option, nor the defendant's practices together, constituted an illegal
tie-in or an unreasonable restraint of trade. 590 F.2d at 932-33, 935.
,5 504 F.2d at 891.
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Once that fact is recognized, there is no basis for concluding that the
challenged practice violates established principles of antitrust law. This
has been clearly established by the courts in Sibley, Foster, and Forrest.
Similarly, there is no basis for concluding that the lender's exercise of its
right to be represented by counsel is either unfair or deceptive. To the
contrary, the practice has itself been sanctioned by the rules and regula-
tions governing both state and federally chartered lending institutions in
West Virginia and elsewhere.
The required attorney system ensures the lending institution that its
lien is *secure. This, in turn, enables the borrower to obtain the mortgage
loan. In serving this vital function, the system does not violate either an-
titrust laws or consumer principles. Therefore, attempts to regulate re-
quired attorney systems must be viewed as unnecessary of governmental
regulation under the guise of consumer protection.
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